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1. Introduction 
In theory elections ought to be a peaceful mechanism of leadership selection, which make 
governments accountable to citizens and thereby discourage corruption and rent seeking. Yet, the 
introduction of elections in countries where their complementary democratic institutions, such as 
the rule of law and a free and independent media, remained weak, has left the behavior of 
competing candidates unconstrained, resulting in contests marred by irregularities, such as vote 
buying, ballot fraud, and voter intimidation (Collier 2009).  
That elections may trigger violence has long caught scholarly attention. Early studies treated 
electoral violence1 as a side effect of democratization or just another manifestation of the 
political instability generally associated with hybrid regimes (e.g., Huntington 1968; Dahl 1971; 
Huntington 1991). For them, intimidation and violence around elections are the regrettable, yet 
ultimately unavoidable “birth pangs” associated with political liberalization, which will 
eventually disappear as countries become fully democratic or slide black into autocracy.  
More recent studies, however, suggest that electoral violence is not a by-product of political 
liberalization, but a strategic tool in the competition for office (e.g., Austin 1995; Laakso 1999; 
Klopp and Zuern 2007; Laakso 2007; Hickman 2009; Höglund and Piyarathne 2009; Boone 
2011; Bekoe 2012a). Based on this insight, a small but sophisticated theoretical literature on 
violence as an illicit campaign strategy has formed (e.g., Chaturvedi 2005; Robinson and Torvik 
2009; Collier and Vicente 2012). These theoretical models suggest that violence can be used to 
rig elections in countries lacking the institutional capacity to effectively mediate conflict over 
political power and ensure a level playing field among candidates.  
On the causes of electoral violence, a rapidly growing body of quantitative studies has recently 
emerged. For example, Wilkinson (2004) and Wilkinson and Haid (2009) show that state and 
local electoral incentives explain a large part of the observed variation in Hindu-Muslim riots 
between Indian states. Arriola and Johnson (2012) find that clientelistic corruption inhibits pre-
electoral violence in competitive electoral autocracies – the set of regimes most susceptible to 
such violence. Clientelism, as an informal mechanism of political bargaining, provides elites 
with an alternative for arriving at mutually beneficial outcomes, which lowers the electoral 
stakes and reduces the candidates' incentives to recourse to violence. Hafner-Burton, Hyde and 
Jablonski (2013) find that when institutionally unconstrained incumbents have information 
suggesting that they will lose the election, they become more likely to engage in pre-electoral 
violence. Finally, Taylor, Pevehouse and Straus (2013) find that most violence takes place before 
elections and is committed by incumbents seeking re-election in Sub-Saharan Africa. They also 
demonstrate that pre-existing social conflict and the quality of founding elections shape pre-vote 
violence, while the stability of democratic institutions and weaker economic growth shape post-
vote violence. 
While these institutional, economic, and election-specific differences are doubtlessly 
important, very little attention has been given to the disparities between social contexts in which 
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these elections take place. This chapter addresses this gap by systematically investigating the 
relationship between ethnic voting and pre-electoral violence. Drawing on the civil war, ethnic 
conflict, and electoral violence literatures, I argue that a high level of ethnic voting increases 
electoral competition and reduces the effectiveness of other campaign instruments, which in turn 
creates strong incentives for candidates to supress through the use of violence and intimidation in 
order to increase their electoral chances. Using 54 nationally representative surveys from 19 
different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and four different measures of pre-electoral violence, I 
show that there is indeed a robust positive association between a country’s level of ethnic voting 
and the use of violence during election campaigns. This result provides an explanation for the 
persistent cross-national differences in electoral violence across Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related 
literature and derives the main prediction. Thereafter, I present the data, measurements, and 
empirical strategy used to empirically evaluate the relationship between ethnic voting and pre-
electoral violence. Section four presents the regression results and assesses their sensitivity and 
robustness towards alternative explanations. The final section concludes, discusses the results’ 
implications, and suggests avenues for future research. 
 
2. The Relationship Between Ethnic Voting and Pre-Electoral Violence 
Much research suggests that democratization may affect the risk of conflict both between 
(e.g., Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Ward and Gleditsch 1998, Snyder 2000) and within states 
(e.g., Gleditsch 2002; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Cederman, Hug and Krebs 2010). The link 
between democratization and conflict relies on two mechanisms. First, it is argued that ethnic 
affiliation often dominates other cleavages in post-authoritarian political environments. 
Especially in institutionally weak states with ethnically heterogeneous societies and where the 
provision of local public goods and access to state resources are politically contentious issues, 
ethnicity tends to increase in salience with political competition (e.g., Breton 1964; Mann 2005). 
The second mechanism focuses on the incentives political competition creates among political 
elites to strengthen their ethnic clientele by inciting hostility towards other groups. The resulting 
ethnic outbidding in political mobilization raises tensions and the risk of violence (e.g., 
Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; 2007).  
Although democratization is about much more than elections alone, competitive elections 
play a prominent role in democratic governance and most definitions of democracy (e.g., 
Schumpeter 1942; Dahl 1989; Alvarez et al. 1996). As Bratton (1998, 52) pointed out: “While 
you can have elections without democracy, you cannot have democracy without elections.” The 
arguments above are closely linked to the role of elections as the event inciting political 
competition and thereby exacerbating the risk of conflict. Several empirical studies find evidence 
that elections increase the risk of conflict, violence, and social unrest. Collier and Rohner (2008). 
Mansfield and Snyder (2007) and Strand (2005; 2007) all show that elections in incomplete 
democracies increase the likelihood of conflict breaking out. Looking more precisely at the 
ordering of elections and distinguishing between different types of conflict, Cederman, Gleditsch 
and Hug (2013) find that post-electoral violence and ethnic civil wars are particularly likely to 
erupt after first and second elections following periods of no polling. Focusing on competitive 
elections in developed countries, Anderson and Mendes (2006) explore the link between 
electoral losses and protest behavior and find that political minorities in countries with less 
democratic experience are more prone to resort to violence after elections. Finally, Brancati and 
Snyder (2011) provide evidence that elections held soon after the end of a conflict, when 
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political institutions are still weak, increase rather than decrease the likelihood of a return to 
violence.  
But these claims are not uncontroversial. Other scholars have challenged this negative view 
on empirical grounds. Birnir (2007), for example, argues that democratic elections tend to 
stabilize ethnic politics. This stabilizing effect may be sustained through inclusive representation 
of all ethnic groups in the government process. Lindberg (2009) presents a similar argument. 
Examining all competitive elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, he finds evidence of democratic 
learning through repeatedly held competitive elections, which thereby contribute to successful 
transitions. Finally, Cheibub, Hays and Savun (2012) argue that elections may be a response to 
anticipated conflict and thereby prevent violent conflict in democratizing states. They find that 
once this potential endogeneity concern is taken into account, the relationship between elections 
and conflict is in fact negative. 
Finally, there is a voluminous literature on constitutional design that has looked at the 
relationship between elections and violence in ethnically heterogeneous societies. Two schools 
of thought predominate. The scholarly orthodoxy, most closely associated with Arend Lijphart 
(1977; 1984; 1999) and the consociational model of democracy, has long argued that some form 
of proportional representation (PR) is needed in cases of deep-rooted ethnic divisions to prevent 
violence and civil unrest. Proponents of this view argue that party-list PR is the best choice, as it 
enables all significant ethnic groups, including minorities, to “define themselves” into ethnically 
based parties and thereby gain representation in parliament in proportion to their size in society. 
This allows them to voice their concerns and settle disputes within the political institutions rather 
than violently outside the political process. In contrast to this orthodoxy, critics, led by Donald 
Horowitz (1985; 1990), argue that the best way to mitigate destructive patterns of divided 
societies is to discourage the formation of ethnic parties through the use of electoral systems that 
encourage cooperation and accommodation among rival groups, and therefore work to reduce the 
salience of ethnicity, rather than replicating existing ethnic divisions in the legislature. They 
advocate electoral rules that promote reciprocal vote-pooling, electoral bargaining, and 
accommodation across group lines. 
The empirical evidence tends to support the consociationalist prediction. Cohen (1997), Sisk 
and Reynolds (1998), Saideman et al. (2002), and Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008) all find 
that proportional electoral systems are associated with less violence. Furthermore, Birch (2007) 
finds that single-member districts are more likely to result in electoral misconduct, which 
previous studies (e.g., Tucker 2007; Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2013, Borzyskowski 
2014) have found to significantly increase the risk of post-electoral protests and violence. But the 
causal mechanism through which PR reduces violence is unclear. Huber (2012) finds that 
contrary to the consociationalist claim, PR is associated with less ethnicization of electoral 
behavior. The main reason seems to be that by allowing relatively easy party formation, PR 
allows parties to form that appeal on bases other than ethnic identity, with the result being that 
voters from the same ethnic group often divide their support across a number of parties, often 
nonethnic ones. Moreover, Norris (2013) shows that there is no monotonic relationship between 
the type of electoral system and majority-minority differences in political support. In particular, 
she finds no evidence for the proposition that PR party-list systems are directly associated with 
higher levels of support for the political system among ethnic minorities. 
 
Overall the existing literature on the relationship between elections and violence is somewhat 
inconclusive, in part because it looks at different types of violence (e.g., protests, 
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demonstrations, ethnic conflict, and civil war) and does not directly account for the politicization 
of ethnicity. This chapter circumvents these issues by focusing on a specific type of violence and 
looking specifically at the degree to which ethnicity is politicized. First, and unlike most 
previous research that focuses on different forms of violence in the aftermath of elections, I focus 
on pre-electoral violence – that is, violence committed during the campaign period in order to 
suppress turnout of certain groups of voters. Second, rather than relying on some apolitical 
measure of a country’s ethnic diversity, I focus on the degree of ethnic voting, which measures 
the ethnicization of electoral behavior. Ethnic voting is generally seen as an instrumental action 
that is part of an ongoing exchange between politicians and voters. Politicians mobilize voters 
along ethnic lines promising targeted provision of state resources in exchange for votes and 
voters use ethnicity as cue to gauge the credibility of these promises as well as of past patterns of 
patronage distribution (e.g., Bates 1983; Chandra 2004; Posner 2005; Ferree 2006). The ethnic 
voting measure captures the closeness of the relationship between vote choice and ethnic group 
identity. It measures the role of ethnicity in relation to a political activity and is therefore 
conceptually distinct from the commonly used measures of ethnic diversity, which are based 
exclusively on the relative size of the various groups. 
How is the degree to which ethnicity determines vote choice associated with pre-electoral 
violence? I argue that there is a positive relationship between ethnic voting and pre-electoral 
violence. Two potential mechanisms explain why. First, if group identity determines vote choice 
perfectly, then elections degenerate into head counts and campaigning becomes highly 
ineffective (Chandra 2004). Programmatic appeals no longer work in convincing citizens to 
switch their vote, since they generally concern public policies that cannot be targeted towards a 
specific group. Even patronage, which can be targeted towards specific groups, is ineffective, as 
according to the instrumental logic of ethnic voting described above, promises will not be 
credible if coming from a candidate of a party with a different ethnic support base. Hence, faced 
with losing the election, candidates have strong incentives to resort to the only instrument left: 
violence. By sending thugs to suppress turnout of the competitor’s supporters through violence 
and intimidation in competitive districts, candidates are able to increase their vote share and 
secure electoral victory.  
The second mechanism is complementary, but focuses on electoral competition rather than 
the ineffectiveness of nonviolent campaign strategies. The higher the degree of ethnic voting, the 
fewer politically unaffiliated voters there are that can be influenced. The fewer undecided voters 
there are, the greater electoral competition, since the value of each additional vote increases. 
Rather than engaging in a costly electoral battle over the few unaffiliated voters, candidates may 
be tempted to deter those voters from casting their ballot and thereby save resources and energy. 
Thus, as before a higher degree of ethnic voting creates strong incentives for candidates to 
engage in pre-electoral violence. 
 
3. Research Design 
Why Sub-Saharan Africa? 
Although the theoretical arguments above are sufficiently general to apply to all competitive 
elections in developing countries, I limit the empirical evaluation of the connection between 
ethnic voting and pre-electoral violence to Sub-Saharan Africa for two reasons. First, many Sub-
Saharan African counties made the transition towards more competitive electoral regimes in the 
early 1990s, going through a historically similar transition period (Bratton and Van de Walle 
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1997; Lindberg 2006). Regular multiparty elections are now held in almost all African countries 
(with the exception of Eritrea, Somalia, and Swaziland), but the integrity of these contests is 
often questionable (e.g., Bratton 1998; Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler 2007). Most importantly, 
these elections vary considerably with regard to pre-electoral violence. Figure 1 shows the 
percentage of elections with significant campaign violence for three different measures of pre-
electoral violence, which are discussed in greater detail below. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Overall the maps for the different measures look very similar. While countries such as Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Botswana, or Mozambique experienced no election campaigns with significant 
violence, states like the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Kenya, or Zimbabwe had significant per-electoral 
violence in more than half of their elections in the first two decades since the end of the Cold 
War. 
 
Second, Sub-Saharan Africa is currently the only region for which a sufficiently large 
number of comparable and nationally representative surveys with both sufficiently fine grained 
information on the respondent’s ethnicity and vote intensions exists. This is necessary in order to 
generate the ethnic voting measure.2 A substantial literature in African politics shows a broad 
correspondence between voters’ ethnicity and vote choice (e.g., Melson 1971; Horowitz 1985, 
Posner 2005), but also notes that there is considerable cross-national variation in the degree to 
which ethnicity determines vote choice (e.g., Norris and Mattes 2003; Dowd and Driessen 2008; 
Dunning and Harrison 2010). In fact, as illustrated below Sub-Saharan Africa is the ideal testing 
ground for this proposition, since the cross-national variation in ethnic voting is particularly 
large. 
 
Data  
Pre-electoral violence is measured by four distinct election-specific measurements. The first 
measure is taken from Lindberg (2009), who offers an ordinal measure of violence during the 
campaign period and on Election Day for all multiparty elections between 1990 and 2007. He 
distinguished between peaceful elections, those with isolated incidents, and those with 
systematic and widespread violence. His classification is based on country-specific academic 
research, reports from international news agencies, such as the British Broadcasting Company 
(BBC) or the Agence France-Press (AFP), and local newspapers assessed via AllAfrica.com.3 
The second measure comes from the African Election Violence Database (AEVD) (Straus 
and Taylor 2012) and is also an ordinal measure of pre-electoral violence, covering all multiparty 
elections between 1990 and 2008. It distinguishes between non-violent, violent harassing, violent 
repressive, and highly violent campaigns. Violent harassment refers to incidents of party 
supporters brawling in the streets, the police and security forces breaking up rallies, the 
confiscation of opposition newspapers, and the disqualification of certain opposition candidates. 
Violent repression refers to incidents of high-level assassinations, long-term high-level arrests of 
party leaders and the consistent use of violent intimidation and harassment. Finally, an election 
campaign is considered highly violent, if repeated widespread physical attacks occurred, leading 
to a substantial number of deaths over time. The coding is based on the U.S. State Department's 
annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, which are written by the U.S embassy 
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personnel in those countries, Amnesty International's annual Human Rights Watch reports and 
the journalistic coverage in Africa Report.4 
The third measure of electoral violence is taken from the National Elections Across 
Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012). The dichotomous 
variable NELDA 33 indicates whether there was significant violence involving civilian deaths 
during an election between 1945 and 2010. Similar to the previous two measures, the coding is 
based on news reports, archives, and country reports from the library of congress and the U.S. 
State Department. Unlike the previous two measures, which focus explicitly on pre-electoral 
violence, this measure is not limited to the campaign period. Relying on additional variables 
from NELDA (i.e., NELDA 29 and NELDA 31) and the case notes in the dataset, I cleaned the 
measure of pure post-electoral violence cases. According to the codebook, the measure includes 
no specific threshold of deaths, but violence must be `significant' and at least one civilian must 
have been killed. 
The final measure of pre-electoral violence is derived from the Social Conflict and Africa 
Database (SCAD) (Hendrix and Salehyan 2013), which codes all forms of social conflict in 
Africa between 1990 and 2011. Following Daxecker (2013), I count the number of election-
related violent events six months prior to Election Day.5 A higher number of events indicate 
more pre-electoral violence. The SCAD event coding is based on AFP reports in Lexis Nexis. 
The four country-level measures of pre-electoral violence are positively correlated 
ranging from 0.60 to 0.81, indicating that they capture a similar phenomenon, although they were 
coded independent of each other by different research teams and rely on different coding 
schemes and sources. Hence, finding a consistent effect of an independent variable across these 
different indicators provides robust empirical evidence, as the association cannot easily be 
dismissed due to coding error or bias of a specific source. 
 
A country’s degree of ethnic voting is measured using Huber’s (2010) index of ethnic voting 
(EV). The index captures the extent to which knowledge of a voter’s ethnicity allows you to 
predict his/her vote intent. The EV index is based on Gallagher’s (1991) disproportionality index 
normalized by the number of ethnic groups in a country, so that it ranges from zero to one, where 
higher values indicate a higher degree of ethnic voting. To better understand what this index 
measures, consider a country with two ethnic groups A and B and two political parties. If all 
members of group A vote for one party and all members of group B vote for the other party, then 
ethnicity is a perfect predictor of individual voting behavior and the EV index will be one. But as 
more and more up until half of all members of the two ethnic groups switch their alliance from 
one party to the other, ethnicity becomes an increasingly worse predictor of an individual’s vote 
choice and the value of the EV index drops towards zero.6  
The construction of the EV index requires a list of relevant ethnic groups and 
representative surveys with questions on respondents’ ethnicity and vote intent. Fortunately, the 
Afrobarometer surveys (round 3 and later) provide this information7 for a total of 20 different 
Sub-Saharan African countries. To identify a country’s relevant ethnic groups, I use the group 
list of the Ethnic Groups in Power dataset 2.0 (EPR-ETH) (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010). 
This list identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups at the national level between 1946 and 
20098, where ethnicity is broadly defined as any group based on linguistic, religious, racial, and 
caste identities. A group is considered politically relevant if it is either discriminated against by 
the state or political elites make ethnic claims on behalf of it. Political relevance and thereby 
temporal variation are the main two differences between the EPR-ETH and the Fearon (2003) 
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group list, which Huber (2010) uses. As previous research recommends focusing on politically 
relevant ethnic groups when studying ethnic politics (e.g., Posner 2004), I opted for the EPR-
ETH list.9 For each country answers to the ethnicity question in the surveys were matched to the 
EPR-ETH group list. In the vast majority of country-election years (27 out of 43) matching the 
ethnic groups in the surveys to the groups in the EPR-ETH list was perfect. In the remaining 16 
country-election years the largest EPR-ETH group I was unable to match, made up less than 2% 
of the country's population and the total proportion of unmatchable groups in a country never 
exceeded 4% of a country's population. Overall, the surveys are pretty representative of the 
ethnic composition of a country, as the high correlation (r = 0.91) between the ethnic 
fractionalization scores from the EPR-ETH database and the surveys indicate. These surveys are 
therefore an appropriate data source to examine ethnic behavior across countries. 
Figure 2 presents a scatter plot between ethnic fractionalization and ethnic voting.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
The scatter plot clearly indicates that the EV index is different from ethnic fractionalization 
and cannot be explained exclusively by the underlying levels of ethnic diversity. With the 
exception of Mali (MLI), Tanzania (TZA), and Zimbabwe (ZWE), African countries generally 
have quite high ethnic fractionalization scores and among highly fractionalized countries there is 
considerable variation in the degree of ethnic voting. Countries with an ethnic fractionalization 
index between 0.8 (Benin (BEN)) and 0.9 (Mozambique (MOZ)) have EV scores ranging from 
0.024 (Mozambique (MOZ08)) to 0.469 (Kenya (KEN08)). In addition, Sub-Saharan African 
countries cover a large part of the empirical spectrum of ethnic voting, making them the ideal 
testing ground to study the impact of ethnic voting on campaign violence. While countries such 
as Mozambique (MOZ08) (EV = 0.024), Senegal (SEN05) (EV = 0.06), and Botswana (BWA08) 
(EV = 0.096) exhibit virtually no ethnic voting, others such as Kenya (KEN08) (EV = 0.469), 
Ethiopia (ETH07) (EV = 0.412), and Nigeria (NGA08) (EV = 0.321). 
 
The main set of control variables include the political regime as measured by the Polity IV index  
(Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2010), the level of economic development (Heston, Summers and 
Aten 2013), and the degree of ethnic fractionalization (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010). 
Previous studies (e.g., Arriola and Johnson 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2013) have 
found that established democracies have less violent elections and it is widely held that the 
politicization of ethnicity is particularly likely in the early stages of democratic development 
(e.g., Birnir 2007; Lijphart 2002, 38). Similarly, low levels of economic development are 
commonly associated with violence and conflict (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and could 
increase the political salience of ethnicity in politics as different ethnic groups struggle for access 
to state resources. If political and economic development reduces campaign violence, the Polity 
and GDP per capita variable should have negative coefficients. Finally, since previous research 
has found that fractionalization of politically relevant groups is positively association with 
conflict (e.g., Cederman and Girardin 2007) and Figure 2 points towards a positive, but low 
correlation with the degree of ethnic voting, I also include the ethnic fractionalization index. If 
more ethnically fractionalized countries are in fact prone to more violence during election 
campaigns, this coefficient should be positive. 
Aside from these main controls, a series of country- and election-specific control variables 
(e.g., conflict and electoral history of a country, the electoral system, or the degree of geographic 
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isolation of ethnic groups) are also considered. They are discussed in greater detail during the 
analysis. Summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis are provided in the appendix. 
 
The necessary individual-level data to construct the EV index restricts the number of Sub—
Saharan African countries included in the analysis. In the following analysis I use data on 54 
election-years in 19 different countries throughout Sub-Saharan Africa between 2004 and 2011. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
The small number of observations also restricts the available statistical techniques to isolate 
the association between the degree of ethnic voting and pre-electoral violence. I therefore regress 
the EV index on different measures of campaign violence with a limited set of controls (i.e., 
Polity, GDP per capita, and ethnic fractionalization) and then stepwise include a series of 
measures associated with alternative explanations to account for potential selection issues. 
Linear probability models are estimated using the Lindberg, AEVD, and NELDA measures of 
pre-electoral violence10 and a negative binominal regression is run on the SCAD count data to 
account for over-dispersion. Because the dataset includes multiple surveys per country and 
election year, all regressions are weighted by the inverse of the observations frequency and the 
standard errors are clustered at the country-level. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
Bivariate Relationships 
Figure 3 illustrates the bivariate relationships between ethnic voting and the four measures of 
pre-electoral violence, after excluding the Zimbabwean elections, which have been identified as 
outliers.11 Based on the theoretical discussion above, I expect a positive association between the 
degree of ethnic voting and pre-electoral violence. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
The upper two plots indicate that there is a discontinuous relationship between ethnic voting 
and the Lindberg and AEVD measures of pre-electoral violence. The degree of ethnic voting in 
countries with peaceful elections is not significantly different from countries with low levels of 
campaign violence, but once ethnic voting passes a certain threshold, a country is significantly 
more likely to experience high levels of pre-electoral violence. Hence, any positive association 
between ethnic voting and violence will be driven by the significant difference between the 
highest and all lower categories, which is why I dichotomized both measures. Doing so makes 
the two measures identical in my subset of Sub-Saharan African countries, so that they are 
treated as a single dependent variable in the subsequent analysis. 
The plot in the lower left corner presents the relationship between the NELDA measure of 
electoral violence and ethnic voting. There is a positive relationship, but it is not as strong as in 
the upper two plots, which may be due to the different violence thresholds. While any violence 
with civilian deaths is coded as significant in the NELDA dataset, both Lindberg (2009) and the 
AEVD (Straus and Taylor 2012) are more restrictive, requiring not only deaths, but also the 
systematic and widespread use of violence during an election campaign. It is therefore not 
surprising that the election campaigns coded as violent by Lindberg and the AEVD are a subset 
of those coded as violent by NELDA. 
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Finally, note the overall positive association between the number of violent events in the six 
months prior to an election and the level of ethnic voting. The 2005 Tanzanian general elections 
seem to be a prominent outlier: although Tanzania has a low level of ethnic voting, it had almost 
as many violent incidents during the campaign period as Kenya in 2002 or Nigeria in 2007. A 
closer inspection reveals that the vast majority of those events occurred in Zanzibar, two islands 
(Pemba and Unguja) off the coast of Tanzania, whose small population is more ethnically 
divided (i.e., mainland Africans versus people of Arab origin),12 considerably poorer than the 
mainland Tanzanians (i.e., $220 versus $600 GDP per capita), and whose past multiparty 
elections in 1995 and 2000 have been marred by accusations of fraud and violence (Laakso 2007, 
237-238; Bekoe 2012b, 132). Hence, if we were able to divide Tanzania into Tanganyika (i.e., 
mainland Tanzania) and Zanzibar, the two cases would nicely fit the overall positive association: 
Tanganyika would have a very low level of ethnic voting and very few violent events, whereas 
Zanzibar would have a higher degree of ethnic voting and a high number of violent campaign 
events. 
 
Regression Analysis 
Table 1 presents the regression results for the different measures of electoral violence on 
ethnic voting.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
As indicated by the bivariate correlations in Figure 3, there is a positive association between 
ethnic voting and electoral violence across all measures of pre-electoral violence. The 
association remains statistically significant and the coefficient even increases by roughly 50% for 
the NELDA and SCAD measures after adding the main set of control variables. Moreover, the 
association between ethnic voting and electoral violence is substantively important: an increase 
of the ethnic voting index by 0.1 (i.e., slightly less than one standard deviation) increases the 
probability of significant pre-electoral violence between 18 and 30 percentage points or more 
than doubles the number of violent incidents during the campaign period. The majority of the 
estimates for the control variables point in the expected direction: more ethnically fractionalized, 
less democratic, and less developed countries experience more violence during election 
campaigns, but most of those coefficients are statistically insignificant. This may be due to the 
similarity of the countries, especially after controlling for Zimbabwe. Finally, the positive and in 
most models highly significant coefficient of the Zimbabwe dummy supports the notion that 
Zimbabwean elections are outliers: they are significantly more violent than the average African 
election although ethnicity is a very weak predictor of individual vote choice. 
 
Robustness 
To assess the robustness of the association between ethnic voting and pre-electoral violence, 
I stepwise add a series of country- and election-specific variables to the regression models. Table 
2 presents the results of the regressions with additional country-specific control variables. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Conflict, especially ethnic conflict, may strengthen ethnic cleavages and thereby contribute 
to ethnic voting and create a “culture of violence" (Omotola 2010), which makes violence an 
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excepted way to resolve arguments and social tensions. As a result, the association between 
ethnic voting and campaign violence may be due to the countries' different conflict histories. To 
check for this, columns 1-3 in Table 3 include three different conflict related measures: the 
number of peace years (i.e., years since last conflict), number of past conflicts since 
independence, and a dummy variable indicating whether a country was involved in a conflict 
with at least 25 conflict related deaths during the election year. All measures are taken from the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Thémner and Wallensteen 2011). The positive association 
between ethnic voting and pre-electoral violence remains both statistically and substantively 
significant, independent of the measure of electoral violence and the conflict control. 
Interestingly, time since last conflict is positively related to pre-electoral violence, suggesting 
that campaign violence is a distinct phenomenon that does not just occur in and right after 
conflicts. Conflict history is positively related to pre-electoral violence, supporting the notion 
that repeated fighting might strengthen ethnic cleavages, but fails to reach conventional levels of 
statistical significance. Finally, current conflict involvement has a negative coefficient estimate 
that reaches statistical significance in the negative binomial regression, suggesting that the 
measures – and especially the SCAD count variable – does in fact capture election-specific 
violence and not just incidents occurring during an election campaign, but that are unrelated to 
the electoral process. 
Next, I consider the impact of decentralization. Scholars have widely argued that 
decentralization can politicize ethnic identities, though there is no agreement on how this works 
(Brancati 2009). Ethnic voting might therefore be more prevalent in decentralized political 
systems. At the same time, electoral competition in federal states may be more peaceful, as 
power is divided between the states and the federal government, which reduces the electoral 
stakes at the national level. To see whether the results regarding ethnic voting are robust when 
controlling for decentralization, I add a dummy variable indicating whether a country has a 
federal structure. The variable is taken from Treisman (2002) and supplemented by own research 
for missing cases.13 The impact of ethnic voting remains strong and there seems to be no clear 
relationship between federalism and pre-electoral violence across the three measures. 
As a last country-level control, I consider the role of geographic concentration. If individuals 
from the same ethnic group tend to live in the same region and are therefore exposed 
predominantly to members of their own group with little exposure to members of other groups, 
then they might form group-specific viewpoints and interests, and thus vote together with their 
own ethnic kin. Moreover, if these regions are electorally equally strong and vary in other 
politically relevant aspects, then elections may have particularly high stakes, creating incentives 
for electoral violence and other forms of electoral manipulation. To account for this potentially 
omitted variable, I include a measure of geographic isolation used by scholars studying 
residential segregation. It captures the extent to which members of an ethnic group are exposed 
only to one another and can theoretically range from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates perfect isolation  
(Massey and Denton 1988, 288).14 To calculate this measure, I use the region variable of the 
same surveys that were used in the EV calculation. The region variable refers to the highest 
subnational administrative unit (e.g., the states in federal systems and provinces in centralized 
systems). The relationship between ethnic voting and pre-electoral violence remains statistically 
significant in two of the three measures. Only in the count model does the coefficient estimate 
fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. The coefficient of the geographic 
isolation index is generally positive, suggesting that countries with high ethnic segregation are 
more likely to experience violent election campaigns. 
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Next, I consider the robustness of the association with respect to election-specific controls. 
Table 3 presents those regression results.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Several studies provide evidence that the salience of ethnicity increases around election time, 
increasing tensions and affecting cross-ethnic interactions (e.g., Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2010; 
Michelitch 2010). Since the surveys used to calculate the EV index were administered at 
different points in time during the countries' electoral cycles, the degree to which ethnicity 
affects an individual's intended vote may vary, introducing bias. To account for this, I include the 
logged number of days between the administration of the survey and the closest national 
election. The inclusion of this variable has little impact on the size and statistical significance of 
the association between ethnic voting and pre-electoral violence. 
Huber (2012) shows that, contrary to most scholarly literature, majoritarian and not PR is 
associated with higher levels of ethnic voting. Moreover, several authors have suggested that 
single member district electoral systems create higher levels of competition and may therefore be 
more likely to incite electoral violence (e.g., Bermeo 2003; Laakso 2007; Höglund 2009). To 
control for this potential omitted variable, I include two different indicators of the legislative 
electoral system: the logged average district magnitude (ADM) in lower house elections (Table 
3, column 2) and a dummy variable indicating whether legislators are elected in single member 
districts (SMD) (Table 3, column 3). Overall, the positive association between ethnic voting and 
pre-electoral violence remains, although the size of the coefficient estimates for the 
AEVD/Lindberg and NELDA measures decrease by about a quarter. There seems to be a 
consistent association between the legislative electoral system and pre-electoral violence, which 
is in line with previous empirical research (e.g., Arriola and Johnson 2012). 
Lindberg (2006) argues that citizens and leaders in democratizing nations learn what it means 
to be democratic through repeated multiparty elections. Similarly, Birnir (2007) suggests that 
repeated multiparty elections reduce ethnic voting. If this is true, than the association between 
ethnic voting and pre-electoral violence might be driven by the countries' difference in electoral 
experience. Yet, controlling for the logged number of consecutively held previous multiparty 
elections does not affect the coefficient of ethnic voting, indicating that the degree of ethnic 
voting does not decline along with greater competitive electoral experience (Table 3, column 4). 
The results regarding the impact of the logged number of past elections on electoral violence are 
mixed. While it seems to reduce the number of pre-electoral social conflict events, it seems to 
increase the risk of significant pre-electoral violence as measured by NELDA. 
Finally, I control for electoral competitiveness. Existing research has shown that supporter 
mobilization (and consequentially opponent supporter demobilization) becomes more important 
as electoral competitiveness increases, which provides incentives for candidates to engage in pre-
electoral violence and mobilize their co-ethnics (e.g., Mitchell 1995; Chaturvedi 2005; 
Wilkinson 2004). Due to the lack of alternatives (e.g. reliable pre-campaign election polls), I 
calculate a proxy of electoral competitiveness using the winner and the runner-up's vote shares in 
presidential and the winner and the runner-up's seat shares in legislative elections.15 The vote and 
seat share data was taken from Lindberg (2009) and Nunley (2013). The coefficient estimates of 
ethnic voting remain positive and significant for two of the three measures of electoral violence. 
The impact of electoral competitiveness is mixed: the NELDA regression indicates that 
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campaign violence increases and the SCAD number regression suggests that electoral 
competitiveness decreases campaign violence. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 4 presents the result of a series of sensitivity tests. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Columns 1-3 in Table 4 present the results after dropping all duplicate country-election year 
observations, keeping the observation closest to the past election. Unsurprisingly, the estimates 
become noisier after dropping more then 20% of the observations, which reduces the power of 
the analyses. Nevertheless, all coefficients remain positive and the size of the coefficient for the 
AVED/Lindberg indicator remains unchanged, while they decrease substantially for the other 
two measures. Overall, the main regression results survive even after dropping a substantive part 
of the observations and remain statistically significant. Their substantive effect – although still 
relative large – is somewhat sensitive to the size and composition of the sample. 
Columns 4-6 in Table 4 present the regression results after adding additional controls for 
those observations that were found to be influential in leverage-versus-squared-residual plots. 
Controlling for these influential observations has little effect on the association between ethnic 
voting and pre-electoral violence. The coefficient estimates remain significant and roughly 
identical in size. Thus, the association between ethnic voting and pre-electoral violence does not 
seem to be the result of just a few influential observations. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter explored the relationship between the degree of ethnic voting and the pre-electoral 
violence. I have argued that higher levels of ethnic voting should increase the likelihood of 
violent election campaigns, since it increases electoral competition and renders other campaign 
tactics, such as programmatic appeals and patronage, ineffective. To evaluate this prediction 
empirically, I use data on 54 election-years in 19 different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
between 2004 and 2011. Overall, the analysis suggests that there is a robust positive association 
between ethnic voting and pre-electoral violence. It survived the inclusion of various additional 
controls that account for alternative explanations and remained statistically and substantively 
significant even after controlling for influential observations.  
The chapter contributes to two related literatures. First, it adds to the broader literature on 
elections and violence by offering a more nuanced view on the relationship between ethnicity, 
elections, and violence. In the vast majority of regression models ethnic factionalization had no 
significant impact of pre-electoral violence, while the ethnic voting index is significantly related 
to campaign violence. Hence, at least with regard to pre-electoral violence, not ethnic diversity 
per se, but the politicization of ethnicity for electoral purposes increases the risk of violence. 
Second, with regard to the more specialized literature on electoral violence, the chapter 
highlights the importance of the social structure and behavior of the electorate next to the 
institutional and economic factors emphasized in previous research. Given that the degree of 
ethnic voting does not change much over time, this chapter points towards an additional 
explanatory factor for the persistent cross-country differences in electoral violence across Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
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Although the empirical scope of the paper is limited to Sub-Saharan Africa, the theoretical 
arguments are general and not limited to any specific region. Different degrees of ethnic voting 
may therefore also explain differences in electoral violence in other parts of the world. 
Unfortunately, survey data on ethnicity and vote choice is still limited for most other regions, but 
with the sixth wave of the World Value Survey being released soon, a wider range of comparable 
and nationally representative surveys will become available, allowing researchers to replicate 
this study in other parts of the world plagued by electoral violence, such as Southeast Asia and 
the Caribbean.  
Future research should also expand the empirical analysis within Sub-Saharan Africa, which 
remains in many ways preliminary due to data limitations. With the Afrobarometer Wave 5 
being released soon, it will become possible to create a country-election year panel dataset on 
ethnic voting, allowing us to look more precisely at the causal connection between the degree of 
ethnic voting and the extent of pre-electoral violence. 
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FIGURE 1: Percentage of Sub-Saharan African Elections with Significant Pre-Electoral 
Violence 
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FIGURE 2: Relationship Between Ethnic Fractionalization and Ethnic Voting 
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FIGURE 3: Relationship Between Ethnic Voting and Four Measures of Pre-Electoral Violence 
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TABLE 1: Main Regression Results of Pre-Electoral Violence on Ethnic Voting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 AEVD/Lindberg AEVD/Lindberg NELDA NELDA # SCAD # SCAD 
 Dummy Dummy Violence Violence Events Events 
Ethnic Voting  1.904* 1.820* 2.053* 3.082*** 5.512* 8.268** 
 (1.020) (0.880) (1.061) (0.535) (3.214) (4.078) 
Ethnic Fractionalization   0.858  1.034  9.753 
  (0.792)  (1.227)  (6.276) 
Polity IV (lagged)  0.021  -0.091***  -0.035 
  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.107) 
GDP p.c. (log, lagged)  -0.103  -0.026  0.334 
  (0.081)  (0.115)  (0.539) 
Zimbabwe 1.258*** 1.636*** 0.889** 0.690 2.824*** 8.441** 
 (0.157) (0.498) (0.341) (0.740) (0.729) (3.842) 
Constant -.306 -0.324 0.060 -0.360 -0.563 -11.858 
 (0.181) (0.667) (0.364) (1.531) (0.797) (7.943) 
Weighted N 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Clusters 10 10 10 10 10 10 
NOTES: Estimates in columns 1-4 come from linear probability models, estimates in columns 5 
and 6 from negative binomial regressions. All regressions are frequency weighted and standard 
errors are clustered at the country-level. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and 
estimates statistically significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). 
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TABLE 2: Adding Country-Specific Controls to Main Regression of Pre-Electoral Violence on 
Ethnic Voting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Additional Control Variables  
 Peace Conflict Current  Geographic 
 Years History Conflict Federalism Isolation 
Panel A: AEVD/Lindberg Dummy      
Ethnic Voting 1.486** 2.284*** 1.908* 1.739* 1.913* 
 (0.623) (0.629) (0.883) (0.940) (1.032) 
Additional Control 0.037** -0.184 -0.750 0.227 0.672 
 (0.015) (0.132) (1.045) (0.412) (1.227) 
Panel B: NELDA Violence      
Ethnic Voting 2.922*** 2.355** 3.145*** 3.189*** 3.274*** 
 (0.572) (0.846) (0.626) (0.572) (0.642) 
Additional Control 0.018 0.288 -0.535 -0.301 1.381* 
 (0.011) (0.170) (0.623) (0.310) (0.631) 
Panel C: # SCAD Events (6 months)      
Ethnic Voting 4.574* 7.779** 9.358** 7.126*** 8.763 
 (2.401) (3.559) (3.687) (2.597) (6.211) 
Additional Control 0.134*** 0.410 -4.811** 2.167*** 4.025 
 (0.039) (0.939) (2.309) (0.457) (17.460) 
Weighted N 32 32 32 32 32 
Clusters 10 10 10 10 10 
NOTES: Estimates in panels A and B come from linear probability models, estimates in panel C 
from negative binomial regressions. All regressions include the following control variables: 
ethnic fractionalization from the EPR-ETH dataset, Polity IV (lagged), GDP p.c. (log, lagged) 
and a dummy for Zimbabwe. All regressions are frequency weighted and standard errors are 
clustered at the country-level. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and estimates 
statistically significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). 
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TABLE 3: Adding Election-Specific Controls to Main Regression of Pre-Electoral Violence on 
Ethnic Voting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Additional Control Variables  
 Time in Electoral System Electoral System # Multiparty Electoral 
 Election Cycle (log(ADM)) (SMD==1) Elections Competition 
Panel A: AEVD/Lindberg Dummy     
Ethnic Voting 1.852* 1.405* 1.310 1.777* 1.914 
 (0.929) (0.678) (0.728) (0.894) (1.069) 
Additional Control -0.011 -0.067 0.258 -0.102 -0.115 
 (0.038) (0.055) (0.235) (0.539) (0.631) 
Panel B: NELDA Violence     
Ethnic Voting 3.259*** 1.967*** 1.584** 3.370*** 1.682*** 
 (0.647) (0.488) (0.532) (0.564) (0.514) 
Additional Control -0.062 -0.180*** -0.758*** 0.678* 1.706*** 
 (0.053) (0.049) (0.228) (0.342) (0.406) 
Panel C: # SCAD Events (6 months)     
Ethnic Voting 9.038* 10.273* 9.200* 7.808*** 13.313** 
 (4.855) (5.733) (5.108) (2.745) (5.569) 
Additional Control -0.154 0.224 -0.391 -3.748*** -5.988* 
 (0.139) (0.455) (1.516) (0.763) (3.478) 
Weighted N 32 32 32 32 32 
Clusters 10 10 10 10 10 
NOTES: Estimates in Panel A and B come from linear probability models, estimates in Panel C 
from negative binomial regressions. All regressions include the following control variables: 
ethnic fractionalization from the EPR-ETH dataset, Polity IV (lagged), GDP p.c. (log, lagged) 
and a dummy for Zimbabwe. All regressions are frequency weighted and standard errors are 
clustered at the country-level. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and estimates 
statistically significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). 
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TABLE 4: Sensitivity of Main Regression Results of Pre-Electoral Violence on Ethnic Voting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dropping Duplicate Observations Controlling for Influential Observations 
 AEVD/Lindberg NELDA # SCAD AEVD/Lindberg NELDA # SCAD 
 Dummy Violence Events Dummy Violence Events 
Ethnic Voting 1.848** 1.534* 2.114 2.500* 2.561** 8.268** 
 (0.807) (0.877) (2.536) (1.347) (0.806) (4.078) 
Botswana 2004    0.729** 0.749***  
    (0.316) (0.212)  
Kenya 2007    0.055   
    (0.489)   
Malawi 2005    -0.373 -0.378  
    (0.373) (0.326)  
Nigeria      2.061*** 
      (0.586) 
Weighted N 26 26 26 32 32 32 
Clusters 18 18 18 10 10 10 
NOTES: Estimates in columns 1-2 and 4-5 come from linear probability models, estimates in 
columns 3 and 6 from negative binomial regressions. All regressions include the following 
control variables: Ethnic Fractionalization from the EPR-ETH dataset, Polity IV (lagged), GDP 
p.c. (log, lagged) and a dummy for Zimbabwe. Columns 4-6 are frequency weighted and the 
standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the country-level. The standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and estimates statistically significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are 
marked with ** (*, ***). 
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Appendix Tables 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 1: Summary Statistics  
Variable Type Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Lindberg High Violence Dummy 0 0.182 0.390 0 1 
AEVD High Violence Dummy 0 0.182 0.390 0 1 
NELDA Violence Dummy 0 0.386 0.493 0 1 
# SCAD events (6 months) Count 1 2.773 3.516 0 11 
Ethnic Voting (EPR-ETH) Index 0.198 0.193 0.126 0.005 0.469 
ELF (EPR-ETH) Index 0.780 0.710 0.229 0.070 0.939 
Ethnic Voting (Fearon) Index 0.159 0.189 0.116 0.016 0.464 
ELF (Fearon) Index 0.805 0.770 0.158 0.351 0.953 
Polity IV (lagged) Index 5.5 4.068 3.920 -4 9 
GDP p.c. (log, lagged) Index 6.985 7.080 0.841 5.685 9.112 
Peace Years Years 22 21.773 15.303 0 50 
Conflict History Count 1 1.455 2.040 0 13 
Time in Election Cycle (log) Days 5.966 5.719 1.198 0 7.249 
Electoral Competition Index 0.665 0.603 0.265 0.176 0.982 
Avg. District Magnitude (log) Index 0 0.840 1.525 0 4.711 
# Multiparty Elections Count 1.099 1.239 0.385 0 2.079 
Federalism Dummy 0 0.273 0.451 0 1 
Geographic Isolation Index 0.645 0.690 0.163 0.348 0.983 
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Endnotes 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Electoral violence differs from other forms of political violence in its timing and motivation. For the purpose of 
this paper, I define electoral violence as any harm or threat of harm against voters during the election process. This 
is narrower than the IFES (2013) definition of electoral violence, which includes candidates, property, and the 
electoral process itself as targets. Electoral violence may occur at three distinct periods during the election process: 
between the beginning of the campaign period and election day, on election day, and between closing of the polls 
and the inauguration of the newly elected body (Höglund 2009). This paper focuses on pre-electoral violence; that is 
the election related violence occurring during the campaign period up until election day. 2	  Other cross-national surveys containing the necessary information are the World Value Survey (WVS) and the 
Comparative Studies of Electoral System Surveys (CSES). But most of the countries included in these surveys are 
consolidated democracies, which differ in various aspects from developing countries and generally have free, fair 
and non-violent elections. Moreover, they tend to vary little and have low levels of ethnic voting. 
3 Elections after 2007 were coded by the author following Lindberg’s coding rules and using only the sources he 
listed. 
4 As before, I expand the AEVD coding for elections after 2008, relying only on the sources they listed and 
following their coding rules. 
5 In order to check the robustness of my findings with regard to the somewhat arbitrarily chosen six-month time 
period, I have also coded the number of events in the three months period up to election day. The two measures are 
highly correlated (r = 0.977) and all findings are qualitatively identical, suggesting that the choice of time frame 
does not matter. 
6 Formally, a country's degree of ethnic voting is equal to   𝐸𝑉 = !!!!!!    𝐸𝑉! ∗ 𝑠!!!!! = !!!!!!    !! (𝑉!!!!!! ∗ 𝑉!) ∗ 𝑠!!!!! , 
where G is the total number of ethnic groups in a country, EVg is a group g's degree of ethnic voting, which is based 
on the adapted Gallagher index with Vgp indicating the proportion of individuals in that group supporting party p and 
V p indicating the proportion in society supporting party p, P denotes the number of political parties, and sg the 
proportion of group g in the country's population. Birnir (2007) offers an alternative index of ethnic voting based on 
the volatility of electoral support for political parties, based on the assumption that higher levels of ethnic voting 
results in less volatility. The problem with her measure is that it does not only capture ethnic voting, as various other 
factors may also affect electoral volatility. Brancati (2008) offers another alternative, focusing on the vote share of 
regional parties, which are often ethnic based. While some regional parties are in fact ethnic (e.g., the Basque 
National party in Spain), other ethnic parties are not regional (e.g., the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India), 
rendering this measure problematic. In fact, Huber (2010, 11) shows that it is only weakly correlated with his ethnic 
voting index. 
7 The ethnicity question is phrased “What is your tribe? You know your ethnic or cultural group?" and the vote 
intent question captures vote intent and is worded “If a presidential election was held tomorrow, which party's 
candidate would you vote for?". 
8 For the two elections in 2011 in my dataset, I extend their coding using the same sources and following their 
coding rules. 
9 Empirically, there is little difference in the EV index between the two group lists. In my dataset the EV values 
based on the EPR-ETH or Fearon (2003) group list are highly correlated (r = 0.976) and all reported results below 
are qualitatively similar across the two lists.  
10 Non-linear models, such as ordered and regular logit or probit, are prone to complete separation problems with 
small samples, severely restricting the number of control variables that can be included. This is why I chose to run 
linear probability models. The estimates of the linear probability model are generally more conservative regarding 
statistical significance than their non-linear counterparts due to the linear functional form. 
11 Zimbabwe is the poorest and most autocratic country in the dataset, is ethnically relatively homogenous (i.e., the 
EPR-ETH ethnic fractionalization index is 0.37), and displays little ethnic voting (i.e., EV = 0.025), but generally 
has very violent elections (see Figure 1). Country-specific factors, such as Mugabe's highly autocratic and repressive 
regime, his lack of popularity throughout most of the country, the militarized youth wing of the regime party 
ZANU-PF, the empty state coffers, and the dismal state of the country's economy account for the high level of 
campaign violence in the absence of ethnic voting (Meredith 2002; Boone and Kriger 2012). 
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12 Unfortunately, the number of respondents in Afrobarometer Surveys from the islands of Zanzibar is too small to 
calculate a reliable ethnic fractionalization and EV score. 
13 The Sub-Saharan African countries with a federal structure in my dataset are Benin, Ethiopia, Madagascar, 
Nigeria, and South Africa. 
14 The country-level measure is defined as follows:   𝐼 = !!!!! !!!!!!!!! !!!!!!! , 
where r is a region, n is the total number of regions, g is an ethnic group, G is the total number of ethnic groups, prgis 
the population of group g in region r, Pg is the total population of group g in the country, T is the total population of 
a country, and Tr is the total population in the region r. The greater the index I the more geographically isolated are 
the ethnic groups in a country. 
15 Electoral competition is calculated using the following formula: Electoral  Competition!" = 1 − !!"!!!"!!"!!!", 
where W stands for the vote/seat share of the winner in country i at election t and S denotes the vote/seat share of the 
runner-up. The closer the vote/seat share of the winner and the runner-up, the smaller the fraction, and the greater 
the electoral competitiveness.	  
